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NOTES 
Beyond the Eye of the Beholder: Aesthetics and Objectivity 
"Beauty has been queen in many areas but has never been a favorite 
of the law."t 
It was once believed that there was enough beauty for everyone, 
so there was no need to conserve it. Environmental despoilation was 
justified on the ground that the economic development it facilitated 
was more important than the beauty that was lost. It has since be-
come increasingly apparent that it is also important to preserve and 
even improve the aesthetic environment. In response, legislatures 
have enacted measures that restrict further depredations on both 
natural and urban areas. The courts, however, have been reluctant 
to uphold such measures on aesthetic grounds alone. This problem 
has arisen because of the common judicial belief that aesthetic evalu-
ations and standards are a matter of individual taste, which varies 
from person to person, and are thus too subjective to be applied in 
any but an arbitrary and capricious manner.1 Consequently, accord-
ing to this view aesthetic legislation violates the due process clause 
of the fourteenth amendment.2 
t Agnor, Beauty Begins a Comeback: Aesthetic Considerations in Zoning, 11 J. Pun. 
L. 260, 260 (1962). 
I. Perhaps the best statement of the subjectivity argnment is in City of Youngstown 
v. Kahn Bros. Bldg. Co., 112 Ohio St. 654, 661-62, 148 N.E. 842, 844 (1925): 
It is commendable and desirable, but not essential to the public need, that our 
aesthetic desires be gratified. Moreover, authorities in general agree as to the 
essentials of a public health program, while the public view as to what is necessary 
for aesthetic progress greatly varies. Certain Legislatures might consider that it 
was more important to cultivate a taste for jazz than for Beethoven, for posters 
than for Rembrandt, and for limericks than for Keats. Successive city councils 
might never agree as to what the public needs from an aesthetic standpoint, and 
this fact makes the aesthetic standard impractical as a standard for use 
restriction upon property. The world would be at continual seesaw if aesthetic con-
siderations were permitted to govern the use of the police power. We are therefore 
remitted to the proposition that the police power is based upon public necessity, 
and that the public health, morals, or safety, and not merely aesthetic interest, 
must be in danger in order to justify its use. 
See also Mayor &: Council v. Turk, 14 Del. Ch. 392, 407, 129 A. 512, 518 (Ch. 1925); 
Forbes v. Hubbard, 348 ill. 166, 181, 180 N.E. 767, 773 (1932); Mayor &: City Council v. 
Mano Swartz, Inc., 268 Md. 79, -, 299 A.2d 828, 835 (1973); People v. Stover, 12 N.Y.2d 
462, 471, 191 N.E.2d 272, 278, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734, 741 (1963) (Voorhis, J., dissenting); 
Comment, Zoning, Aesthetics and the First Amendment, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 81, 91 
(1964); Comment, Aesthetics as a Zoning Consideration, 13 HAsnNcs L.J. 374, 375 (1962). 
When aesthetic issues appear in legal controversies, the party that stands to lose on 
the aesthetic issue has strong motivation to falsify his aesthetic judgments in order to 
advance his economic interests. If the legal system takes such claims to be genuine aes-
thetic judgments, aesthetic disagreements are exaggerated. This may be one explana-
tion for the persistence of the subjectivity argument. 
2. See, e.g., Appeal of Medinger, 377 Pa. 217, 104 A.2d 118 (1954); City of Passaic v. 
Paterson Bill Posting, Advertising &: Sign Painting Co., 72 N.J.L. 285, 62 A. 267 (Ct. 
Err. &: App. 1905). 
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The term "aesthetic legislation," as used in this Note, refers only 
to legislation that bears upon the visual character of the physical en-
vironment, rather than to legislation on problems of noise and odor.3 
The legal system has handled problems of the latter sort much bet-
ter;~ only the sense of sight has been left unprotected. Perhaps one 
reason for its neglect is that in order to make an area visually pleas-
ing positive programs, such as zoning, must be used, as well as pas-
sive prohibitions of such noxious uses as billboards. Noise and odor 
problems, which can be resolved by prohibitions alone, have been 
more easily addressed by the common law doctrine of nuisance.5 
I. CURRENT STATE OF THE LAw 
When legislation protecting aesthetic interests has been enacted 
in the past, courts have either declared it unconstitutional under 
the due process clause6 or upheld it on the basis of nonaesthetic in-
terests also served by the legislation.7 In a controversy where aesthetic 
3. This definition also excludes matters that, although sometimes classified as aes-
thetic by courts and legal writers, are in fact objectionable on other grounds. See, e.g., 
Jones v. Trawick, 75 S.2d 785 (Fla. 1954) (cemetery in residential area); Hatcher v. 
Hitchcock, 129 Kan. 88, 281 P. 869 (1929) (funeral home in residential area); Sweet v. 
Campbell, 282 N.Y. 146, 25 N.E.2d 963 (1940) (funeral home in residential area). See 
generally Comment, Funeral Homes: Their Location in the Community as Controlled 
by Zoning Ordinances, Restrictive Covenants, and the Law of Nuisance, 20 SYRACUSE 
L REv. 45 (1968). Cemeteries and funeral homes are objectionable because they remind 
people of death, a subject considered unpleasant in our society. The objection is not 
aesthetic as that term is used here. While they may offend people's sensibilities, see 
Note, Aesthetic Nuisance: An Emerging Cause of Action, 45 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1075, 1078 
(1970), they do not directly despoil the visual environment. Indeed, a cemetery's park-
like atmosphere and statuary decoration may be visually attractive. 
4. For some reason nuisance law is very protective of the nose. While it is difficult 
to legislate visual standards, noxious odors can be abated without any enabling legisla-
tion at all: Common law has held for centuries that nobody has a right to subject an-
other to foul odors, see, e.g., Aldred's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 816 (K.B. 1610) (hog farm); 
Duncan v. City of Tuscaloosa, 257 Ala. 574, 60 S.2d 438 (1952) (chicken farm in city); 
Higgins v. Decorah Produce Co., 214 Iowa 276, 242 N.W. 109 (1932) (poultry-packing 
plant), or noxious gases, see, e.g., United Verde Extension Mining Co. v. Ralston, 37 
Ariz. 554, 296 P. 262 (1931) (copper smelter). For similar cases involving loud noises, 
see Kentucky &: W. Va. Power Co. v. Anderson, 288 Ky. 501, 156 S.W.2d 857 (1941) 
(monotonous humming of power generators); Gorman v. Sabo, 210 Md. 155, 122 A.2d 
475 (1956) (radio). 
5. For discussions of aesthetic nuisance, see Broughton, Aesthetics and Environmental 
Law: Decisions and Values, 7 LAND &: WATER L. REv. 451, 458-66 (1972); Leighty, 
Aesthetics as a Legal Basis for Environmental Control, 17 WAYNE L. REv. 1347, 1347-60 
(1971); Noel, Unaesthetic Sights as Nuisances, 25 CORNELL L.Q. I (1939); Note, supra 
note 3. 
6. See, e.g., Crawford v. City of Topeka, 51 Kan. 756, 33 P. 476 (1893); City of Pas-
saic v. Paterson Bill Posting, Advertising&: Sign Painting Co., 72 N.J.L. 285, 62 A. 267 
(Ct. Err. 8: App. 1905); National Land 8: Inv. Co. v. Easttown Twp. Bd. of Adjustment, 
419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965). 
7. See, e.g., St. Louis Gunning Advertising Co. v. City of St. Louis, 235 Mo. 99, 
137 S.W. 929 (1911); New York State Thruway Authority v. Ashley Motor Court, 10 
N.Y.2d 151, 176 N.E.2d 566, 218 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1961). As recently as 1965 a court quoted 
with approval the statement that 
1440 Michigan Law Review [Vol, 71:1438 
interests have been pitted against interests of some other sort, the 
aesthetic interests have lost, 8 and where one party has urged an 
aesthetic interest in addition to other values, the aesthetic interest 
has not been taken into account.9 
This strict traditional view has been under attack since its incep-
tion.10 The partisans of aesthetic legislation have not carried the day, 
but they have made substantial progress.11 Although a complete 
analysis is beyond the scope of this Note, it appears that the current 
state of the law is as follows: Fourteen jurisdictions have accepted or 
have indicated that they are receptive to the view that legislation 
based solely on aesthetic considerations is valid.12 The plurality view, 
Specifically, billboard ordinances and regulations, where reasonable, are justified 
under the police power for any or all of the following reasons: (1) billboards being 
temporary structures are liable to be blown down and thus injure pedestrians; 
(2) they gather refuse and paper which may tend to spread conflagrations; (3) they 
are used as dumping places for dirt, filth and refuse, and as public privies; 
(4) they serve as hiding places for criminals; and (5) they are put to use by dis-
orderly persons for immoral purposes. • • . 
Norate Corp. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 417 Pa. 397, 404-05, 207 A.2d 890, 894 (1965), 
quoting 7 E. MCQUILLAN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 24.380, at 310·11 (3d ed. 1949), 
8. See, e.g., Goldman v. Crowther, 147 Md. 282, 128 A. 50 (1925); Appeal of Medinger, 
377 Pa. 217, 104 A.2d 118 (1954); White's Appeal, 287 Pa. 259, 134 A. 409 (1926). 
9. See, e.g., City of Passaic v. Paterson Bill Posting, Advertising & Sign Painting Co., 
72 N.J.L. 285, 62 A. 267 (Ct. Err. & App. 1905); Appeal of Lord, 368 Pa. 121, Bl A.2d 
533 (1951). 
10. Litigation concerning aesthetic regulation first appeared at the beginning of the 
twentieth century. One of the earliest cases to sustain aesthetic legislation was Attorney 
General v. Williams, 174 Mass. 476, 55 N.E. 77 (1899), afjd. on other grounds, 188 U.S. 491 
(1903) (statute that set height limits and required ornamentation of buildings in an 
historic square in Boston upheld). Courts first began to invalidate aesthetic legislation 
in litigation over billboard control ordinances. See, e.g., City of Passaic v. Paterson 
Bill Posting, Advertising & Sign Painting Co., 72 N.JL. 285, 62 A. 267 (Ct. Err. & App. 
1905). For early defenses of aesthetic regulation, see Baker, Aesthetic Zoning Regula• 
tions, 25 MrcH. L. REv. 124 (1926); Larrcmore, Public Aesthetics, 20 HARV, L. R.Ev. 35 
(1906); Light, Aesthetics in Zoning, 14 MINN. L. REv. 109 (1930). 
11. Only six courts in the past twenty-five years have invalidated an ordinance that 
was primarily aesthetic in its impact. Bachman v. State, 235 Ark. 339, 359 S.W .2d 815 
(1962); Mayor & City Council v. Mano Swartz, Inc., 268 Md. 79, 299 A.2d 828 (1973); 
City of Jackson v. Bridges, 243 Miss. 646, 656, 139 S.2d 660, 664 (1962); City of Scotts• 
bluff v. Winters Creek Canal Co., 155 Neb. 723, 728, 53 N.W .2d 543, 547 (1952); Little 
Pep Delmonico Restaurant, Inc. v. City of Charlotte, 252 N.C. 324, 113 S.E.2d 422 
(1960); City of Norris v. Bradford, 204 Tenn. 319, 321 S.W.2d 543 (1958). See also Farley 
v. Graney, 146 W. Va. 22, 119 S.E.2d 833 (1960) (general validity of ordinance rccog• 
nized but specific application held to be arbitrary and capricious). 
Two commentators suggest that the liberalization of the judicial attitude toward 
aesthetic regulation follows the general liberalization in courts' attitudes on the effect 
of the fourteenth amendment due process clause on exercises of the police power. 
Ridda, The Accomplishment of Aesthetic Purposes Under the Police Power, 27 S. CAL. 
L. REv. 149, 150 (1954); Comment, Outdoor Advertising Control Along the Interstate 
Highway System, 46 CALIF. L. REv. 796, 813 (1958). See also Oregon City v. Hartke, 240 
Ore. 35, 47,400 P.2d 255, 261 (1965). 
12. Perhaps the strongest support for the view that legislation based solely on aes-
thetic grounds is permissible is found in Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954). This 
case arose out of a community redevelopment program that Congress had enacted for 
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held by twenty-three states, is that an ordinance based solely on 
aesthetic considerations is not valid, but that aesthetic legislation is 
valid if it also serves some other legitimate interest.13 In fourteen 
the District of Columbia. In upholding the legislation Justice Douglas wrote for a 
unanimous Court: 
It is within the power of the legislature to determine that the community should 
be beautiful as well as carefully patrolled. In the present case, the Congress and its 
authorized agencies have made determinations that take into account a wide 
variety of values. It is not for us to reappraise them. If those who govern the 
District of Columbia decide that the Nation's Capital should be beautiful as well 
as sanitary, there is nothing in the Fifth Amendn:ient that stands in the way. 
348 U.S. at 33. 
Other cases that indicate a receptivity to aesthetic legislation arc: Petition of 
Franklin Builders, Inc., 207 A.2d 12 (Del. Super Ct. 1964); Rotenberg v. City of Port 
Pierce, 202 S.2d 782, 785-86 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967); Sunad, Inc. v. City of Sarasota, 
112 S.2d 611 (Fla. 1960); State v. Diamond Motors, Inc., 50 Hawaii 33, 38, 429 P.2d 825, 
827 (1967); Moore v. Ward, 377 S.W.2d 881, 886-87 (Ky. 1964); Jasper v. Common-
wealth, 375 S.W.2d 709 (Ky. 1964); Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 333 Mass. 773, 
128 N.E.2d 557 (1955); Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 333 Mass. 783, 128 N.E.2d 
563 (1955); State ex rel. Wilkerson v. Murray, 471 S.W.2d 460 (Mo. 1971), cert. denied, 
404 U.S. 851 (1971) (aesthetic reasons for laws "inextricably intertwined" with many 
other reasons that give adequate support for the law); Piper v. Meredith, 110 N.H. 
291, 266 A.2d 103 (1964) (dictum); Town of Deering ex rel. Bittenbender v. Tibbetts, 
105 N.H. 481, 485-86, 202 A.2d 232, 234-35 (1964); United Advertising Corp. v. Borough 
of Metuchen, 42 N.J. 1, 198 A.2d 447 (1964) (aesthetic regulation allowable if it bears on 
land utilization); City of Santa Fe v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 73 N.M. 410, 389 P .2d 13 
(1964) (dictum); In re Cromwell v. Ferrier, 19 N.Y .2d 263, 225 N.E.2d 749, 279 N.Y.S.2d 
22 (1967); People v. Stover, 12 N.Y.2d 462, 191 N.E.2d 272, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734, appeal 
dismissed, 375 U.S. 42 (1963); State v. Buckley, 16 Ohio St. 2d 128, 243 N.E.2d 66 (1968) 
(requirement to fence junkyards upheld); Oregon City v. Hartke, 240 Ore. 35, 47-48, 
400 P.2d 255, 262 (1965); State ex rel. Saveland Park Holding Corp. v. Wieland, 269 
Wis. 262, 69 N.W.2d 217, cert. denied, 350 U.S. 841 (1955). 
13. Bachman v. State, 235 Ark. 339, 359 S.W.2d 815 (1962); Desert Outdoor Adver-
tising, Inc. v. County of San Bernadino, 255 Cal. App. 2d 765, 63 Cal. Rptr. 543 (1968); 
Willison v. Cooke, 54 Colo. 320, 130 P. 828 (1913); Murphy, Inc. v. Town of Westport, 
131 Conn. 292, 40 A.2d 177 (1944); Stoner McCray Sys. v. City of Des Moines, 247 Iowa 
1313, 78 N.W.2d 843 (1956) (aesthetics can be auxiliary consideration); Ware v. City of 
Wichita, 113 Kan. 153, 214 P. 99 (1923); City of New Orleans v. Levy, 223 La. 14, 64 
S.2d 798 (1953) (but see State ex rel. Civello v. City of New Orleans, 154 La. 271, 97 
S. 440 (1923)); Wright v. Michaud, 160 Me. 164, 200 A.2d 543 (1964); Mayor & City 
Council v. Mano Swartz, Inc., - Md. -, 299 A.2d 828 (1973); Sun Oil Co. v. City of 
Madison Heights, 41 Mich. App. 47, 199 N.W.2d 525 (1972); Naegele Outdoor Advertising 
Co. v. Village of Minnetonka, 281 Minn. 492, 162 N.W.2d 206 (1968); City of Jackson v. 
Bridges, 243 Miss. 646, 656, 139 S.2d 660, 664 (1962); City of Scottsbluff v. Winters Creek 
Canal Co., 155 Neb. 723, 728, 53 N.W.2d 543, 547 (1952); Little Pep Delmonico Restau-
rant, Inc. v. City of Charlotte, 252 N.C. 324, 113 S.E.2d 422 (1960); National Land 8: 
Inv. Co. v. Easttown Twp. Bd. of Adjustment, 419 Pa. 504, 528 n.29, 215 A.2d 597, 610 
n.29 (1965); City of Providence v. Stephens, 47 R.I. 387, 133 A. 614 (1926); City of Norris 
v. Bradford, 204 Tenn. 319, 321 S.W.2d 543 (1958); Niday v. City of Bellaire, 251 S.W.2d 
747, 750 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952); Connor v. City of Univ. Park, 142 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. Civ. 
App. 1940); Kenyon Peck, Inc. v. Kennedy, 210 Va. 60, 168 S.E.2d 117 (1969); Vermont 
Salvage Corp. v. Village of St. Johnsbury, 113 Vt. 341, 34 A.2d 188 (1943); Lenci v. City of 
Seattle, 63 Wash. 2d 664, 388 P.2d 926 (1964); Farley v. Graney, 146 W. Va. 22, 119 
S.E.2d 833 (1960). The position of Illinois is unclear. In Forbes v. Hubbard, 348 Ill. 166, 
180 N.E. 767 (1932), the Illinois court seemed to approve aesthetics as a valid considera-
tion, but in Neef v. City of Springfield, 380 Ill. 275, 43 N.E.2d 947 (1942), it indicated 
that aesthetics should not be considered. Both cases were cited with apparent approval 
in Trust Co. v. City of Chicago, 408 Ill. 91, 100, 96 N.E.2d 499, 504 (1951). 
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states no case has been found in which the status of aesthetic regula-
tion was before the courts.14 Thus, while aesthetic legislation has 
gained substantial support in recent years, only a minority, al-
though an increasing minority, of states will uphold it even where 
other interests are not served as well. This Note suggests that legis-
lation based solely on aesthetic purposes is legitimate and approves 
the trend toward this position. 
JI. THE OBJECTIVITY OF .AESTHETIC EVALUATIONS 
Judicial uneasiness with aesthetic matters is rooted in the com-
mon view that one person's judgment on aesthetic matters is as good 
as another's. The argument that aesthetic evaluations are subjective 
involves two beliefs: first, that there can be no consensus in matters 
of aesthetics; second, that no aesthetic judgment is more or less 
reasonable than any other because no arguments that rely on 
publicly ascertainable facts can be given in support of an aesthetic 
judgment. From this it is concluded that aesthetics is an inappropriate 
matter for the legal system to deal with15 because any aesthetic regu-
lation would simply impose one person's taste on another who 
legitimately holds a different viewpoint, and any such imposition 
would be arbitrary and capricious.16 If these two beliefs were true, 
courts would be justified in refusing to uphold aesthetic legislation. 
However, recent studies have demonstrated that there is consensus in 
matters of aesthetics and that aesthetic judgments can be supported 
by appeal to publicly ascertainable facts. 
That there can be general agreement in aesthetic judgment is 
demonstrated by two empirical studies. The more important is by 
Shafer, Hamilton, and Schmidt,17 who showed twenty of one hundred 
landscape photographs to each of 250 adults, chosen at random in 
ten Adirondack public camping areas, also selected at random. Each 
person was asked to rank in order of scenic value five pictures 
grouped at random in each of four packets. A predictive model was 
generated on the basis of these data and applied to another set of 
photographs, some new and some from the original set. To test the 
predictive model, six further tests were conducted of the same kind, 
and the results of five of the six tests agreed with the predictions.18 
It was thus established that there is a substantial convergence in the 
14. Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Montana, Nevada, North 
Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming. 
15. E.g., Comment, 13 HAsTI:NGS L.J. 374, supra note 1, at 377. 
16. See, e.g., Trust Co. v. City of Chicago, 408 Ill. 91, 96 N.E.2d 499 (1951); Stoner 
McCray Sys. v. City of Des Moines, 247 Iowa 1313, 78 N.W.2d 843 (1956); Hitchman v. 
Oakland Twp., 329 Mich. 331, 45 N.W.2d 306 (1951). 
17. Shafer, Hamilton & Schmidt, Natural Landscape Preferences: A Predictive Model, 
1 J. LElsURE R.E5EARCH 1 (1969). 
18. Id. at 15. 
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aesthetic judgments of a cross-section of people looking at photo-
graphs of scenic areas. The authors of the study believe that it is 
reasonable to assume that these results are applicable to evaluations 
of natural landscapes themselves.19 
In the second study, by Kaplan, Kaplan, and Wendt,20 each of 
eighty-eight subjects rated approximately one third of fifty-six slides 
for complexity and preference on a five-point scale ( each was rated 
separately).21 The slides depicted nonspectacular scenes of three 
kinds: nature scenes, urban scenes, and scenes combining both nat-
ural and man-made features. The investigators found that natural 
settings were so vastly preferred over urban settings that only one 
nature slide was rated lower on the preference scale than the most 
preferred urban slide.22 Thus, this study indicates very strong agree-
ment on the aesthetic superiority of natural over urban settings. 
Although the two studies are somewhat limited in scope, they do 
demonstrate the falsity of the belief, held by many of those who 
claim that aesthetic evaluations are subjective, that no consensus can 
be reached on aesthetic matters. 
The second belief, that arguments relying on publicly ascer-
tainable facts cannot be given in support of aesthetic judgments, is 
refuted by two kinds of evidence: evaluation and criticism in the 
arts, and evaluation of the aesthetic character of landscapes. 
Art critics commonly support their evaluations by such argu-
ments. For example, in his review of Frank Lloyd Wright's project 
for House on the Mesa, Denver, Colorado, Hitchcock says: 
The concrete block shell system is combined with the cantilevered 
slab roof on isolated supports to produce an architecture as weightless 
and non-massive as that of Le Corbusier .... 
The use of ornament is restricted on this house to a few accents 
of pierced blocks. But the three dimensional design is very rich, not 
to say complicated. The variations of level, the emphasis upon the 
suspension of the glass walls of the living room, the independence 
of the cantilevered roofs, the different degrees of extension of the 
separate units lead to a multiplication of lines and planes. Yet the 
whole is firmly tied together by the long corridor and solid wall 
which protects the whole complex on one side. . . . [T]his latest 
house of Wright's is a striking aesthetic statement .... 28 
In this discussion Hitchcock gives three reasons for his evaluation 
19. Id. at 14. 
20. Kaplan, Kaplan &: Wendt, Rated Preference and Complexity for Natural and 
Urban Visual Material, 12 PERCl!:PTION &: PSYCHOPHYSI~ 354 (1972). 
21. Id, at 354. The subjects were asked to indicate "how intricate or complex" and 
"how pleasing" they found the slides. Id. 
22. Id. at !155. 
2ll. Hitchcock, Frank Lloyd Wright-Model in the Exhibition, in MODERN ARCHlTEC-
TURE INTERNATIONAL ExHIBmoN 38, 38 (Museum of Modern Art 1932). 
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that the home has aesthetic merit: first, the arrangement of the con-
crete block shell system and the cantilevered slab roof; second, the 
contrast between the sparse ornamentation and the complex three-
dimensional design; third, the unifying placement of the corridor 
and the wall. Hitchcock thus gives, in support of his aesthetic judg-
ment, arguments that rely on specific and perceivable features in 
the work and that consequently can persuade others of the reason-
ableness of his position. The kind of reasoning that supports aes-
thetic judgments in the visual arts should carry over to judgments of 
aesthetic quality in the environment. In both cases the visual at-
tractiveness of the object is evaluated, and the reasoning process in 
both is built on the same factors-for example, the interplay be-
tween colors and the relationships of the forms and lines when 
viewed from various angles. In fact, in the case of legislation impos-
ing architectural controls some of the aesthetic evaluations that will 
be called for will be precisely the same as those used in architecture 
criticism. 
Four studies relating to the aesthetic evaluation of landscapes 
apply even more directly to the aesthetic regulation of the natural 
environment and demonstrate that arguments appealing to descrip-
tive features can be decisive. In a two-part study Leopold focused 
upon the aesthetic quality of rivers,24 comparing twelve selected sites 
in the Hells Canyon area of Idaho. In the first part of his study, he 
identified forty-six descriptive characteristics25 and described up to 
five distinguishable descriptive categories for each characteristic. 
Assuming that aesthetic merit is a function of uniqueness,26 he then 
calculated a uniqueness ratio for each descriptive characteristic, 
24. L. LEOPOLD, QUANTITATIVE COMPARISON OF Soi.IE .AEsnlETIC FACTORS AMONG 
RlvERS (Geological Survey Circular 620, 1969). 
25. He divided these into physical factors, such as river patterns, width, depth and 
velocity, basin area, erosion of banks, and width of valley floor; biological and water 
quality factors, such as water color, turbidity, floating material, fauna, and pollution 
evidence; and human use and interest factors, such as incidence of trash and litter, arti-
ficial controls, accessibility, vistas, and land use. For a complete list of factors and the 
assignment of evaluation numbers to descriptive categories, see id. at 2-ll. 
26. That uniqueness, or originality, as it is usually expressed, contributes to aes-
thetic value is generally recognized by writers in aesthetics. See, e.g., M. BEARDSLEY, 
.AEsnIEncs: PROBLEMS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF CRITICISM 460 (1958); Gallie, The Function 
of Philosophical Aesthetics, in .AEsrnEncs AND LANGUAGE 13, 26-27 (:,V. Elton ed. 1954); 
Meager, The Uniqueness of a Work of Art, in .AEsTHETICS AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF 
CRITICISM 520 (M. Levich ed. 1963). See also I. KANT, CRITIQUE OF .AEsnlETIC JUDGMENT 
§ 46 CT· Meredith trans. 1911). But nobody holds, as Leopold does, that aesthetic merit is 
a function of uniqueness alone, or that there is a high correlation between uniqueness 
and aesthetic merit. 
For a treatment of uniqueness as a source of economic value when ·applied to an 
area of scenic value, see Krutilla &: Cichetti, Evaluating Benefits of Environmental Re-
sources with Special Application to the Hells Canyon, 12 NATURAL R.EsoURcES J. l 
(1972). 
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using as his basis the number of sites that shared each descriptive 
category. The more unique an area was according to his formula, the 
more aesthetically valuable it was considered to be.27 
In the second part of his study, Leopold assumed that the spec-
tacular character of rivers is a function of their size and apparent 
speed, and that of mountains is a function of their height and the 
narrowness of adjoining valleys.28 After making calculations based 
on these factors for each of the twelve sites, he concluded that the 
river valley of Hells Canyon was the most spectacular.29 Leopold 
then compared Hells Canyon with four other sites known for their 
aesthetic merit-the Merced River in Yosemite National Park, the 
Snake River in the Grand Teton National Park, the Yellowstone 
River in Yellowstone National Park, and the Grand Canyon of the 
Colorado River. Of these, the Grand Canyon was found to be the 
most majestic, as one would expect. Hells Canyon was a close second, 
followed by a virtual tie between the Yellowstone River and the 
Snake River in the Tetons.80 
The factors used in both of Leopold's calculations are strictly 
empirical and thus publicly ascertainable.81 For example, in the first 
part of the study the width of the river, its depth at low flow, its 
velocity, and its bankfull depth were measured in feet, and the basin 
area was measured in square miles.32 Similarly, in the second part of 
the study, valley character was determined by graphing valley width, 
height of hills, degree of scenic outlook (determined by the number 
of scenic features observable), and urbanization (determined by 
number of buildings, houses, roads, and other factors indicating use 
by man).83 
In a second study Weddle developed a system similar to Leo-
pold's to evaluate the landscape in the Clyde Estuary in England for 
the purpose of recommending a location for the development of 
large-scale industry that would least disrupt the aesthetic character 
27. The famous Hells Canyon site was the second most unique of the twelve sites, 
and by assumption the second most desirable. L. LEoPoLD, supra note 24, at 7. 
Leopold's assumption did not work for the most unique location, which turned out to 
be a very ordinary river valley scene. This result was due to its being the only ordinary 
scene in a group otherwise consisting of spectacular sites; if the study had also included 
other ordinary river valleys, this particular site would certainly have been far below 
the others on the list. 
28. Id. at 7, 10. 
29. Id. at IO. 
!10. Id. at 12. 
!11. It is arguable that three categories-special views, historical features, and misfits 
-are not strictly empirical. But, in light of the large number of descriptive categories 
used, the elimination of these three would have little effect on the evaluation of any 
site studied. 
!12, L. UOPOLD, supra note 24, at 2. 
!Ill. Id. at 7-9. 
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of the area.34 He divided his analysis into two parts: the inherent 
landscape quality of a site, and its acquired quality. The former was 
determined by a comparative evaluation of ten factors, sis in which 
each area was rated objectively on a three-value scale. A similar eval-
uation was made for landscape values, based on the presence of resi-
dents, day visitors, and resident vacationers, 36 and a total evaluation 
was calculated from these data.87 Like Leopold's, this system provides 
an objective, empirical measure of the visual attractiveness of a 
landscape. 
Sargent's system of evaluating landscapes deals with scenery along 
highways.ss He established two experimentally derived categories-
distance ratings, and variety and interest ratings. Each site was given 
a rating of zero to five in each of the two categories, depending, in 
the first, on the distance to the horizon, and in the second, on the 
number of features such as hills, fields, forests, water, farmsteads, 
distant villages, ledges, and land improvements.89 A separate evalua-
tion was made, where appropriate, for eyesores and for points of 
interest, such as historic monuments, old mills, and natural phenom-
ena. The only features of this evaluation that are nondescriptive in 
any sense are the degree of distastefulness of the eyesores and the 
amount of intrinsic interest in the points of interest.40 All other 
factors were determined according to an objective measuring or 
counting process. 
Yet another approach to the evaluation of landscape features is 
found in the Upper Great Lakes region highway planning study,41 
34. Weddle, Techniques in Landscape Planning: Landscape Evaluation, 55 J. TOWN 
Pl.ANNING INST. 387 (1969). 
35. The ten factors were grouped into four categories: viewpoints and foreground 
(subdivided into (I) viewpoints-abundant and varied, offering a variety of prospects; 
(2) framing-by rocks, trees, and other features; (3) foreground-of farmland, parkland, 
shore, attractive buildings, other features); view (subdivided into (4) structure of in-
teresting land forms and vegetation color, texture, and massing; (5) land use-farming. 
field, boundary hedges, walls, industry, urban areas; (6) objects-architectural or engi-
neering, water, boats, birds, animals; (7) edges-where one kind of landscape gives way 
to another); background (subdivided into (8) objects-sea, islands, ships, structures; (9) 
structure-of land forms and vegetation massing); and lighting (which consisted of 
(10) prevailing climate, light, shade, shadow, clouds, light reflecting from water or 
clouds). Id. at 387. 
36. Id. at 388. 
37. Id. 
38. Sargent, A Scenery Classification System, 21 J. SOIL &: WATER CONSERVATION 26 
(1966). 
39. Id. 
40. These attributes were considered only on a comparative basis, not on an absolute 
scale. Disagreements are likely to arise only in borderline cases. See text accompanying 
note 47 infra. 
41. 5 Edwards 8e Kelcey, Inc., Upper Great Lakes Region, Highway Planning Studies 
Summary Report (undated). Unlike the other four approaches, this study multiplies 
together the factors used, rather than summing them. 
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which determined the aesthetic value of a view along the highway 
by a consideration of five factors: the number of observable scenic 
features, whether or not a scene is viewable from both directions of 
travel, the inherent interest of the scene,42 the possible viewing time, 
and the angle of view.43 Using this information, one can lay out a 
highway to take advantage of the best scenes available.44 
Like the analogy to art criticism, these four studies show the 
possibility of pointing to publicly determinable descriptive factors 
in support of aesthetic judgments.45 It is not suggested that any one 
of the approaches discussed above will be applicable as such in a 
particular case, for a formula must be devised that includes all the 
relevant factors for each kind of aesthetic judgment. 
Since it is possible to make reasonable arguments to support 
aesthetic judgments, it follows that it is possible to develop expertise 
in making such judgments and arguments. Individuals who may be 
considered experts in aesthetic matters are scattered throughout the 
disciplines of planning, architecture, land development, landscape 
architecture, civil engineering, art, and art criticism.46 If the legisla-
ture deems it necessary, these experts can be called upon to assist in 
the drafting of aesthetic legislation, or they can be used as a planning 
or review board to implement the legislation once it has been 
enacted. 
The fact that reasonable and objective aesthetic evaluations can 
be made does not mean that uncertainty will never arise in border-
line cases. But this should not invalidate a scheme of legislation as 
a whole. The law need not demand absolute certainty. It should be 
sufficient for the courts, if the legislature finds that the interest is 
important, that in the large majority of cases there can be general 
consensus in aesthetic judgments and that these judgments can be 
supported by reasoned arguments appealing to publicly ascertain-
able facts.47 
42. The inherent interest of a view is determined by comparing it to other views. 
For a similar approach, see note 40 supra and accompanying text. 
43. Edwards &: Kelcey, Inc., supra note 41, at 12. 
44. Id. 
45. See also Linton, The Assessment of Scenery as a Natural Resource, 84 ScoTI'ISH 
GEOGRAPHICAL MAGAZINE 219 (1968). For a summary of the present state of the art of 
landscape evaluation, see Zube, Scenery as a Natural Resource: Implications of Public 
Policy and Problems of Definition, Description and Evaluation, 63 LANDSCAPE ARCHITEC-
WRE 126 (1973). 
46. JOINT COMMI1TEE ON DESIGN CONTROL, PLANNING AND COMMUNITY APPEARANCE 
22-23, 58-62 (H. Fagin & R. Weinberg ed. 1958). The academic discipline of aesthetics 
would also be a valuable source of expertise. 
47. Cf. J.W. Hampton, Jr., &: Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928) (Taft, 
C.J.): "If Congress shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which 
the person or body authorized to ••• [act] is directed to conform, such legislative action 
is not a forbidden delegation of legislative power." 
1448 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 71:14!18 
III. PRECISION OF .AESTHETIC STANDARDS 
The charge that aesthetic matters are subjective may also indi-
cate another sort of belief. It may be argued that, even though aes-
thetic judgments need not be subjective, it is impossible to draft 
workable and precise standards for inclusion in aesthetic legisla-
tion. 48 Three types of existing statutory programs-billboard con-
trols, scenic area and scenic easement programs, and community 
planning-will be discussed in order to demonstrate that legislation 
directed primarily to aesthetic ends can and does exist, although both 
courts and legislatures may not always acknowledge it explicitly, and 
that it can contain standards that can be easily applied. 
A. Billboards 
Billboard controls49 have generally been upheld by the courts, 
but usually on the basis of nonaesthetic interests.5° For instance, such 
ordinances have been upheld on the grounds that the lots behind bill-
boards are often used as dumping places by robbers and looters51 
or that the signs might fall upon pedestrians in heavy winds or be-
48. See, e.g., Mayor & City Council v. Mano Swartz, Inc., 268 Md. 79, -, 299 A.2d 
828, 833 (1973) (court overturned sign ordinance with detailed standards). 
49. Billboard controls, like other regulations, are enacted under the police power. 
Courts will uphold statutory programs under the police power only if they promote a 
legitimate police power objective-traditionally health, safety, morals, and general 
welfare. See, e.g., Naegele Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Village of Minnetonka, 281 Minn. 
492, 494, 162 N.W .2d 206, 209 (1968). Recent cases have held that aesthetics is a legiti• 
mate objective under the ''general welfare" category. See In re Cromwell v. Ferrier, 
19 N.Y.2d 263, 225 N.E.2d 749, 279 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1967); People v. Stover, 12 N.Y.2d 462, 
191 N.E.2d 272, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734, appeal dismissed, 375 U.S. 42 (196!1). 
When the statute requires a taking of property, as, for instance, when the state 
prohibits an existing billboard for which the landowner is receiving rent, the power 
of eminent domain, rather than the police power, is applicable. Traditionally, eminent 
domain can be used only when the property is taken for a "public use." Hairston v. 
Danville&: W. Ry. Co., 208 U.S. 598 (1908). However, in BeTman, discussed in note 12 
supm, a case that involved taking for slum clearance purposes, the Supreme Court held 
that the taking could be justified, as protecting the interest of "public welfare," on 
aesthetic grounds alone. See note 12 supm. The Court spoke in terms of "public 
purpose" and "police power," instead of "public use," so the case may indicate that 
aesthetics is a legitimate purpose for regulation as well as taking. Although the 
approach taken in Berman may be an aberration, it does indicate that the interests to be 
weighed against aesthetic values in taking cases are similar to those involved in enacting 
regulations, with the additional factor that, when eminent domain is involved, com-
peting property interests will usually be reimbursed to some extent if aesthetic con-
siderations are found to outweigh them. See geneTally Cunningham, Billboard ContTOl 
Under the Highway Beautification Act of 1965, 71 Mrca. L. REv. 1295, 1356-59 (197!1). 
Subjectivity may be a problem in both eminent domain and regulation cases, for 
enactments under the police power and under the power of eminent domain are sub-
ject to the requirement of the due process clause that legislation not be arbitrary or 
capricious. 
50. See note 7 supra; Cunningham, supra note 49, at 1347-50. 
51. See, e.g., St. Louis Gunning Advertising Co. v. City of St. Louis, 235 Mo. 99, 
137 s.w. 929 (1911). 
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come fire hazards.52 Only recently have courts upheld billboard 
regulations on primarily aesthetic grounds. 53 
Since almost all billboards are aesthetic evils, if aesthetic grounds 
were its primary motivation a legislature would prohibit billboards 
altogether.54 This is substantially the position taken by the Highway 
Beautification Act of 1965,55 which requires each state to prohibit 
visible "outdoor advertising signs, displays and devices" within one-
eighth mile from the nearest edge of the right-of-way of interstate 
and primary highways.56 Since the aesthetic interest in prohibiting 
billboards does not invariably weigh more heavily than competing 
nonaesthetic interests, 57 exceptions can be made for directional and 
other official signs conforming to national standards,58 on-premise 
advertising,50 traveler information signs in designated places,60 and 
signs in industrial and commercial areas.61 
Since the prohibition established by the statute is absolute within 
a clearly delineated area and the exemptions are narrowly defined, 
problems of indefiniteness of application have not arisen. For ex-
ample, in Markham Advertising Co. v. State,62 which involved an 
extensive attack by the entire state advertising industry on a state 
billboard control act implementing the predecessor of the Highway 
Beautification Act,63 the problem of vagueness was not even raised. 
52. See, e.g., St. Louis Poster Advertising Co. v. City of St. Louis, 249 U.S. 269 (1919). 
53. Sec, e.g., In re Cromwell v. Ferrier, 19 N.Y.2d 263, 225 N.E.2d 749, 279 N.Y.S.2d 
22 (1967). 
54. In general, this cannot be done without paying just compensation to owners of 
existing billboards. See, e.g., State Highway Dept. v. Branch, 222 Ga. 770, 152 S.E.2d 
372 (1966). See also Markham Advertising Co. v. State, 73 Wash. 2d 405, 439 P.2d 248 
(1968), appeal dismissed, 393 U.S. 316 (1969). 
55. Pub, L. No. 89-285, 79 Stat. 1028 (codified at 23 U.S.C. §§ 131, 136, 319 (1970)). 
This Act is extensively discussed in Cunningham, supra note 49. 
56. 23 U.S.C. § 13l(b) (1970). 
57. See discussion of competing interests in text accompanying notes 108-27 infra. 
58. 23 U.S.C. § 13I(c)(l) (1970). 
59. 23 U.S.C. § 13l(c)(3) (1970). 
60. 23 u.s.c. § 131(£) (1970). 
61. 23 U.S.C. § 13I(d) (1970). 
62. 73 Wash. 2d 405, 439 P.2d 248 (1968), appeal dismissed, 393 U.S. 316 (1969). 
63. Act of April 16, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-38, § 12, 72 Stat. 95. The standards set up 
in the state act were similar to those of the Highway Beautification Act of 1965. See 
Highway Advertising Control Act of 1961, WASH. REv. CooE § 47.42 (1961), as amended, 
(Supp. 1972). 
The statute in :Markham designated "protected areas" and "scenic areas," within 
which no person was permitted to erect or maintain a sign except as provided by the 
statute. WASH. REv. CODE 47.42.030 (1961), as amended, (Supp. 1972). Protected areas 
were the strips within 660 feet of the edge of the right-of-way of interstate highways, 
and scenic areas were similar strips along state highways within public parks, federal 
forests, public beaches, public recreation areas, national monuments, and all other 
areas outside the boundaries of incorporated cities or towns specially designated by the 
state legislature. WASH. REV. CODE § 47.42.020 (1961), as amended, (Supp. 1972). Within 
protected areas four types of signs were permitted: directional or other official signs, 
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Billboard control regulations that are designed primarily for aesthetic 
ends can be defined by the legislature in such a way that there is 
minimal uncertainty of application. 
B. Scenic Areas and Easements 
In a related effort to preserve the beauty of the countryside, a 
number of states have recently adopted programs to protect scenic 
areas, 64 either by purchasing such areas in fee simple or by taking 
scenic easements under the power of eminent domain.65 An example 
of the manner in which aesthetic standards can be established for 
scenic areas programs is demonstrated by the California program, 
enacted under its 1966 Scenic Areas Act.66 In the selection of scenic 
areas an absolute standard is not appropriate, for, unlike the control 
of billboards, this is an affirmative program, rather than a mere 
prohibition. A choice must be made among several areas, many of 
which may be worth preserving. Therefore, the Califomia·legislature 
delegated to the Department of Public Works the responsibility for 
implementing its program of "conservation of scenic lands," rather 
than setting out all the relevant criteria in the statute.67 The criteria 
established by the Department pursuant to this delegation indicate, 
among other things, that the areas selected should contain features 
that will attract the eye of a passing motorist, such as: 
(a) Typical pastoral scenes containing an expanse of open land and 
interesting cultural elements; 
(b) Attractive or interesting growth of natural shrubs, vines, trees, or 
timber stands; 
(c) Views of water or wetlands, such as lakes, stream beds, or ocean 
shores; 
(d) Interesting rock outcroppings or other geologic formations such 
as bluffs or cliff faces; 
(e) Mountain or alpine valley views; 
(£) Selected desert views; 
on-premise property sale or lease signs, signs advertising activities within twelve miles, 
and travel information signs. Within scenic areas signs of the first of these three types 
were permitted.WASH. REv. CODE§ 47.42.040 (1961), as amended, (Supp. 1972). Regulations 
authorized under the statute further limited permissible signs to one sale or lease sign 
for each property owner and one sign advertising on-premise activities, and limited the 
size and spacing of permitted signs. 73 Wash. 2d at 411, 439 P.2d at 252. 
64. For a summary of such programs as of 1968, see Cunningham, Scenic Easements 
in the Highway Beautification Program, 45 DENVER L.J. 167 (1968). For an analysis of 
scenic resources in forest areas and the development of a cataloging scheme and 
vocabulary for discussing them, see R. Litton, Forest Landscape Description and 
Inventories (U.S. Forest Service, Dept. of Agriculture, Research Paper PSW-49, 1968). 
65. Such action was upheld as a legitimate "public use" in Kamrowski v. State, 31 
Wis. 2d 256, 142 N.W.2d 793 (1966). See also Cunningham, supra note 49, at 1357-59. 
66. CAL. Srs. &: Hwvs. CoDE §§ 895-97 (West 1969). 
67. CAL. Srs. &: Hwvs. CoDE § 895 (West 1969). 
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(g) Attractive urban landscape views; 
(h) Historically interesting and appealing sites.68 
In using terms such as "attractive" and "interesting," the regulations 
establish only general criteria, which may not in themselves seem 
sufficiently precise. However, the Department did also enumerate 
more specific criteria, such as: The area should be outlined, if 
possible, by natural features, if it lacks natural boundaries, it should 
be long enough to hold the attention of a motorist passing at fifty 
miles per hour for at least thirty seconds, and the area's maximum 
width should generally be limited to that in which billboard controls 
may be exercised.69 In addition, after the initial site selection is 
made by a selection team, but prior to acquisition of the scenic area, 
the Highway Department's Landscape Architect reviews the site for 
general conformance to the criteria.70 This utilization of expertise 
makes it unnecessary to have criteria drafted with the precision 
necessary to guide the decisions of laymen. In consequence, the crite-
ria used in the California program are sufficiently specific to permit 
effective implementation. 
C. Community Planning 
In urban areas, as opposed to the countryside, aesthetic regula-
tion focuses upon the visual character of a given commercial or 
residential area.71 Zoning, the most common form of community 
planning, has usually been upheld on the ground that industry 
should be separated from the residential parts of a town for reasons 
of health and safety. 72 However, whatever the rationale given, zoning, 
and its private counterparts, have also been the primary method of 
preserving and improving the aesthetic environment.78 Two types of 
68, CAL. DIVISION OF HIGHWAYS, DEPT. OF PUB. WORKS, REPORT ON ACQUISITION OF 
SCENIC .ARUS ADJACENT TO STATE HIGHWAYS (1966), excerpted in Cunningham, supra 
note 64, at 215-16, 
69. Cunningham, supra note 64, at 216. 
70. Id. at 215-16. 
71. While the focus of aesthetic control in urban settings is usually on residential 
areas, more regulation of industrial areas should be encouraged. For the residents of a 
city, the aesthetic character of the residential areas is probably perceived to be the most 
important. Comment, Government Control of Land: Protecting the I-Know-It-When-
I-See-It Interest, 62 Nw. U. L. REv. 428, 446 (1967). But in fact a large majority of 
urban dwellers spend a majority of their waking hours in other parts of the city. Thus, 
it is important to make commercial areas as pleasing as residential areas, insofar as 
this is possible. 
72. See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
73. Several commentators have noted the primarily aesthetic character of zoning 
ordinances. See Anderson, Architectural Controls, 12 SYRACUSE L. R.Ev. 26 (1960); Norton, 
Police Power, Planning and Aesthetics, 7 SANTA CLARA LAW. 171, 172 (1967); Comment, 
Zoning: Aesthetics: the Chameleon of Zoning, 4 TUISA LJ. 48, 54 (1967); Comment, 
Aesthetic Control of Land Use: A House Built Upon the Sand1, 59 Nw, U. L. R.Ev. 372, 
372 (1964). 
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regulations have a particular impact on the visual character of a 
city: (1) requirements prescribing minimum set-backs, side distances, 
and areas, and ma.ximum heights; and (2) architectural controls. 
The impact of the first type of regulation is aesthetic in that mini-
mum distance requirements (setbacks and side distances) provide a 
desirable measure of regularity to the spacing of houses along a 
street; they may also encourage landowners to use the areas on which 
they cannot build for planting lawns, trees, shrubs, and flowers.74 
Minimum area requirements, although primarily intended to control 
population density and average income,75 also enlarge the area avail-
able for lawns, trees, shrubs, and flowers. Maximum height limitations 
preserve the skyline of a city, as well as provide light and air for 
the inhabitants.76 Since these requirements are normally set out in 
terms of specific measurements, their application should present no 
subjectivity difficulties. 
More difficult problems arise when a community attempts to 
impose architectural controls on buildings. Such ordinances prohibit 
excessive dissimilarity in the architectural character of the buildings 
in an area, and, commonly, excessive similarity as well.77 Typically, 
a board of review administers such ordinances and is required to 
consider the facade, the size and arrangement of windows, doors, and 
porticos, and other significant features of design. 78 
One of the purposes for which architectural review boards 
have been used is to preserve the character of historically significant 
sections of cities.79 For instance, a commission has been established 
in New Orleans to pass upon the erection or modification of any 
building in the Vieux Carre section (the French Quarter) of the 
city.80 The commission is to evaluate the full plans and specifications 
74. See, e.g., In re City of New York, 57 App. Div. 166, 68 N.Y.S. 196, afjd., 167 N.Y. 
624, 60 N.E. 77 (1901). 
75. See, e.g., Simon v. Needham, 311 Mass. 560, 42 N.E.2d 516 (1942). 
76. While maximum height limitations have usually been sustained by courts on 
nonaesthetic grounds, see, e.g., Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91 (1909), minimum height 
limitations have been struck down as being for aesthetic purposes, see, e.g., 122 Main 
St. Corp. v. City of :Brockton, 323 Mass. 646, 84 N.E.2d 13 (1949). 
77. Anderson, supra note 73, at 30. For examples of such ordinances, see :Babcock, 
Billboards, Glass Houses and the Law, HARPER'S MAGAZINE, April 1966, at 20, 24-25. 
78. Anderson, supra note 73, at 20. 
79. See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 333 Mass. 783, 128 N.E.2d 563 
(1955); Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 333 Mass. 773, 128 N.E.2d 557 (1955); 
City of Santa Fe v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 73 N.M. 410, 389 P .2d 13 (1964). On the 
preservation of the historical character of historic areas, including a discussion of 
the statutory standards for Vieux Carre, Nantucket, and 'Williamsburg, see Comment, 
Aesthetic Zoning: Preservation of Historic Areas, 29 FORDHAM L. R.Ev. 729 (1961). For 
an early case upholding the use of a commission to administer regulation of buildings 
to preserve their aesthetic quality, see Walnut & Quince St. Corp. v. Mills, 303 Pa. 25, 
154 A.29, appeal dismissed, 284 U.S. 573 (1931). 
80. New Orleans, La., Vieux Carre Ordinance, March 3, 1937, reproduced in part 
in 4 R • .ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 26.93, at 177-80 (1968). The ordinance 
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of the exterior of any such building81 in light of the purpose of the 
ordinance: "that the quaint and distinctive character of the Vieux 
Carre Section of the City of New Orleans may not be injuriously 
affected, and ... that the value to the community of those buildings 
having architectural and historical worth may not be impaired .... "82 
The application of these standards to a particular structure is left 
to the discretion of the committee, at least a portion of whom must 
be trained and practiced architects, experienced in making precisely 
this sort of decision. 83 Since architects presumably know what sorts 
of facts to appeal to in supporting this sort of judgment, the require-
ments of specificity are not as great as they would be if there were 
no administrative board of experts, and they appear to be met in this 
case by the standards set forth in the statute's statement of purpose. It 
should be noted that the committee is not called upon to make an 
evaluation of the intrinsic aesthetic merit of a building, but only to 
determine whether its structure is in accord with that of other 
buildings in the area. This calls only for a comparison, not a judg-
ment of the absolute worth of the proposed building or modification. 
In litigation over historical center protective legislation, courts have 
had no difficulty in finding sufficiently concrete standards in rather 
vaguely worded statutes. 84 . 
Architectural controls are also used to establish and maintain a 
distinctive aesthetic character in more recently established neighbor-
hoods. Like historical center regulation, these controls are typically 
administered by a board of experts who are called upon to determine 
whether a proposed structure fits into the character of a given neigh-
borhood. While such regulations should be sustainable on purely 
aesthetic grounds, they are often tied to the maintenance of property 
values; as such they can be upheld even in those jurisdictions where 
aesthetic regulation is valid only where other purposes are also 
served. However, insofar as these ordinances uphold property value, 
they do so only by means of regulating the aesthetic character of a 
neighborhood. 
is based upon LA. CONST. art. 14, § 22A, and has been upheld consistently in court. 
City of New Orleans v. Levy, 223 La. 14, 64 S.2d 798 (1953); City of New Orleans v. 
Pergament, 198 La. 852, 5 S.2d 129 (1941); City of New Orleans v. Impastato, 198 La. 
206, 3 S.2d 559 (1941). See also State ex rel. Civello v. New Orleans, 154 La. 271, 97 
s. 440 (1923). 
81. Vieux Carre Ordinance § 3, in 4 R. ANDERSON, supra note 80, § 26.93, at 178. 
82. Vieux Carre Ordinance § 3, in 4 R. ANDERSON, supra note 80, § 26.93, at 178. 
83. Vieux Carre Ordinance § 2, in 4 R. ANDERSON, supra note 80, § 26.93, at 177. 
84. See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 333 Mass. 773, 128 N.E.2d 557 
(1955); City of Santa Fe v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 73 N.M. 410, 389 P .2d 13 (1964); Town 
of Deering ex rel. Bittenbender v. Tibbetts, 105 N.H. 481, 202 A.2d 232 (1964); Man-
hattan Club v. Landmarks Preservation Comm., 51 Misc. 2d 556,273 N.Y.S.2d 848 (1966). 
But see City of West Palm Beach v. State ex rel. Duffey, 158 Fla. 863, 30 S.2d 491 (1947). 
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Reid v. Architectural Board of Review85 involved an ordinance 
that acknowledged that considerations other than the protection of 
property values might be at issue. The ordinance established three 
objectives: the protection of the property on which the building was 
to be constructed, the maintenance of the character of community 
development, and the protection of the value of real estate within 
the neighborhood. The architectural review board established to 
administer the ordinance was to achieve these objectives by regulating 
the design, use of materials, finished grade lines, and orientation of 
new buildings in the light of "proper architectural principles."86 
The plaintiff proposed to build a house that on its face would not 
appear to affect property values adversely: It was to be of substantial 
size and equivalent in value to the other homes in the upper-middle-
class suburb of Cleveland. However, its proposed design-a flat-roofed 
complex of twenty modules hidden behind a ten-foot wall-con-
trasted sharply with the surrounding structures, most of which were 
conventional two-and-one-half story homes.87 The review board, 
which consisted of three registered architects with ten years of ex-
perience, rejected the plan on the ground that "it does not maintain 
the high character of community development in that it does not 
conform to the character of the houses in the area."88 Unlike the 
review board, the court was not content to rest its decision on purely 
aesthetic grounds. Although not required to do so by the ordinance, 
it upheld the decision in part on the basis of its finding that the 
proposed structure would be likely to depreciate the value of three 
adjacent lots. 89 
Like the court in Reid, legislative bodies are often reluctant to 
let architectural controls rest on noneconomic grounds alone and 
require that the aesthetic incongruity of a proposed structure 
threaten economic harm before architectural controls may be in-
voked. For example, the ordinance involved in State ex rel. Stoyanoff 
v. Berkeley90 prohibited the construction of buildings that were 
"unsightly, grotesque and unsuitable structures, detrimental to the 
stability of value and the welfare of surrounding property, structures, 
and residents, and to the general welfare and happiness of the com-
munity . • . . "91 Under this statute the architectural board denied 
permission to build a pyramid-shaped house in a neighborhood con-
sisting of Colonial, French Provincial, and English residences, valued 
85. 119 Ohio App. 67, 192 N.E.2d 74 (1963). 
86. 119 Ohio App. at 68, 192 N.E.2d at 76. 
87. 119 Ohio App. at 70-71, 192 N.E.2d at 77. 
88. 119 Ohio App. at 68, 192 N.E.2d at 75. 
89. 119 Ohio App. at 71-72, 192 N.E.2d at 77-78. 
90. 458 S.W .2d 305 (Mo. 1970). 
91. 458 S.W.2d at 306-07. 
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generally from 60,000 dollars to 85,000 dollars. The court upheld 
the board's decision. While a pyramid-shaped house may be an 
architectural tour-de-force, there is good reason to think that it 
would indeed be "unsightly, grotesque and unsuitable" in a very 
traditional neighborhood. However, that it would reduce the value 
of neighboring property, or even threaten the stability of its value, is 
much less certain. Thus, while the ordinance in this case requires a 
finding that property values are threatened, economic factors appear 
in fact to have played a very minor role in the board's decision. 
An ordinance that relied even more strongly upon the detrimental 
effect that aesthetic incongruity may have on property values was in-
volved in State ex rel. Saveland Park Holding Corp. v. Wieland,92 
where the court upheld a zoning ordinance that required, as a con-
dition precedent to the issuance of a building permit, that a three-
member building board, two of whom had to be architects, make a 
finding that "the exterior architectural appeal and functional plan 
of the proposed structure will, when erected, not be so at variance 
with either the exterior architectural appeal and functional plan of 
the structures already constructed or in the course of construction 
in the immediate neighborhood or the character of the applicable 
district established by Ordinance . . . as to cause a substantial de-
preciation in the property values of said neighborhood .•.• "93 How-
ever, as in Stoyanoff, the court placed little emphasis on the protection 
of property values. Although it pointed out that the ordinance could 
be upheld in the interest of protecting property values,94 the court 
cited Berman v. Parker for the proposition that the rule against 
zoning for purely aesthetic considerations may no longer be the law.95 
Furthermore, the court made no inquiry into whether there would 
in fact be a substantial depreciation of property values in this case. 
This court appears to have gone one step further than Stoyanoff, 
finding that, under Berman, the ordinance could be upheld without 
reference to economic harm and that the village's decision to invoke 
architectural controls only where a substantial diminution of prop-
erty value was threatened was not mandated by law. 
These three cases illustrate that, while some courts appear un-
willing to uphold architectural controls for nonhistorical neighbor-
hoods on aesthetic grounds alone and prefer instead to rely on 
unexamined economic consequences that may result from aesthetic 
incongruity, the criterion that is in fact often applied is aesthetic. 
The "diminution of property values" that is often used to justify a 
result is measured only by reference to aesthetic qualities, and the 
92. 269 Wis. 262, 69 N.W.2d 217, cert. denied, 350 U.S. 841 (1955). 
93. 269 Wis. at 265, 69 N.W .2d at 221 (emphasis added). 
94. 269 Wis. at 267-70, 69 N.W.2d at 220-22. 
95. 269 Wis. at 271, 69 N.W .2d at 222, citing Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954). 
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determination that such a diminution will occur is usually made by 
a board of architects, not a board of assessors. 
Like other programs examined above, architectural control leg-
islation does not employ standards for the determination of aesthetic 
merit as precise as those used in the studies described in Part II.96 
However, this is not a fatal flaw, for typically an administrative board 
is set up to implement the programs and apply the standards estab-
lished by the legislature, and the administrators are chosen from 
experts in aesthetic questions. In architectural control programs, for 
example, the review boards usually consist of architects. Similarly, 
the California scenic easement and scenic area program requires that 
the site selection team include a landscape architect, if possible. Only 
billboard control programs and restrictions such as those requiring 
minimum setbacks are not implemented by experts. In both of these 
cases, however, uniform aesthetic standards can be set out in some 
detail at the legislative level. The legislature can determine, for 
example, that all billboards are aesthetic evils. Setback requirements 
similarly take a uniform approach and can be defined in terms of 
specific measurements. In the other cases, it is assumed that the 
experts will use criteria similar to those used in the studies described 
in Part II, on the basis of which they can make decisions that are 
objectively supportable. The provisions for drawing upon expertise 
should make these regulations, the primary impact of which is 
aesthetic, workable and precise enough for effective implementa-
tion, despite the lack of explicit and detailed statutory standards. 
IV. VALIDITY OF .AESTHETIC REGULATION 
Once it is acknowledged that aesthetic judgments and standards 
can be objective, it does not follow that aesthetic legislation should 
be upheld in every case. The legislature must weigh other, competing 
values in determining whether to enact a particular aesthetic regu-
lation. 
As the current state of the case law indicates, many courts and 
commentators apparently assume that of itself aesthetics has no 
value.97 Statutes enacted for aesthetic purposes have been defended, 
not on aesthetic grounds, but rather on the grounds that they prevent 
urban decay98 and that they promote property values,09 the tourist 
96. See text accompanying notes 24-44 supra. 
97. See cases and authorities cited in note 1 supra. 
98. Note, Aesthetic Considerations in Land Use Regulation, 2 WILLAMETIE L.J. 
420, 431-32 (1963). 
99. See, e.g., Town of Lexington v. Govenar, 295 Mass. 31, 36-37, 3 N.E.2d 19, 22 
(1936); Vickers v. Township Comm., 37 N.J. 232, 248, 181 A.2d 129, 137, appeal dismissed, 
371 U.S. 233 (1962); State ex rel. Saveland Park Holding Corp. v. Wieland, 269 Wis. 
262, 69 N.W.2d 217 (1955). 
June 1973] Notes 1457 
industry,100 safety, morality and decency,1°1 efficiency,102 contentment 
and civic pride,103 and the love of one's country.104 In fact, it might be 
suggested that attorneys should defend aesthetic laws on other 
grounds if possible and rely on purely aesthetic arguments only if 
the ordinances in question cannot be otherwise justified. 
But this should be wholly unnecessary. It is here suggested, as 
some philosophers have believed, 105 that aesthetics is an intrinsic 
value which, consequently, does not need justification by appeal to 
other values to which it contributes. In fact, the federal government 
has acknowledged the intrinsic nature of aesthetic value in the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act of 1969,106 which provides that 
In order to carry out the policy set forth in this Act, it is the con-
tinuing responsibility of the Federal Government to use all practi-
cable means, consistent with other essential considerations of na-
tional policy, to improve and coordinate Federal plans, functions, 
programs, and resources to the end that the Nation may . . . (2) 
assure for all Americans . . . esthetically and culturally pleasing 
surroundings ... _101 
As has been demonstrated above, the requirements of due process 
need not bar the implementation of regulations based solely on aes-
100. See, e.g., Merritt v. Peters, 65 S.2d 861 (Fla. 1953); City of Miami Beach v. 
Ocean &: Inland Co., 147 Fla. 480, 3 S.2d 364 (1941). 
101. "Beauty may not be queen but she is not an outcast beyond the pale of 
protection or respect. She may at least shelter herself under the wing of safety, morality 
or decency." Perlmutter v. Greene, 259 N.Y. 327, 332, 182 N.E. 5, 6 (1932). See also 
Kelsey, The Place of Aesthetics in Comprehensive Zoning in Massachusetts, 43 l\!Ass. 
L.Q. 60, 64 (1958) (incongruous structures lead to indifferent maintenance of surrounding 
buildings and increase cost of municipal services for police, fire, and accident protec-
tion); Sayre, Aesthetics and Property Values: Does Zoning Promote the Public Welfare?, 
35 A.B.A.J. 471 (1949) (aesthetic interests related to morals as well as general welfare). 
102. Note, Aesthetics as a Justification for the Exercise of the Police Power or 
Eminent Domain, 23 GEO. WASH. L. R.Ev. 730, 748 (1955) (cheerful hospital decor aids 
recovery, aesthetically pleasing classrooms stimulate learning). 
103. State ex rel. Twin City Bldg. &: Inv. Co. v. Houghton, 144 Minn. 13, 20, 176 
N.W. 159, 162 (1920), revg. on rehearing 144 Minn. 1, 174 N.W. 885 (1919). 
104. "If a person has grown up in an attractive and well-ordered community, rather 
than an ugly, blighted one, certainly his affection for home-his neighborhood-his 
town, his state and nation-will be the stronger. Certainly he will rise to its defense 
more quickly and more whole-heartedly." Note, supra note 102, at 744. 
105. See, e.g., J. DEWEY, ART As ExPERlENCE (1934); J. DEWEY, ExPERIENCE AND 
NATURE 67-102 (1929); M. BEARDSLEY, supra note 26, at 539-43; G. l\IOORE, PRINCIPIA 
ETHICA 200-07 (1956). In fact, some philosophers hold that all other values are valuable 
only insofar as their ultimate base is aesthetic. See, e.g., J. DEWEY, EXPERIENCE AND 
NATURE 67-102 (1929); G. SANTAYANA, THE SENSE OF BEAUTY 21-25 (1896); D. PRALL, A 
STUDY IN THE THEORY OF VALUE 200-01, 274-75 (1921). 
106. Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4331-35, 4341-47 
(1970)). 
107. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, § lOI(b), 42 U.S.C. § 433l(b) 
(1970). See also Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968, § 18, 23 U.S.C. § 138 (1970): "It is 
hereby declared to be the national policy that special effort should be made to preserve 
that natural beauty of the countryside •••• " 
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thetics. If aesthetic value is recognized as intrinsic, it can be weighed 
alone against other interests by legislatures and courts. At times it 
may in itself justify the enactment of a given regulation; in other 
cases, it must be compromised to accommodate competing values. 
Although it is not the purpose of this Note to propose the balance 
that should be struck, it is useful to point out examples of the kinds 
of competing factors that a legislative body may appropriately 
weigh in particular situations. For illustrative purposes, the interests 
that compete with aesthetics in the three statutory programs detailed 
above will be examined. 
The groups opposed to sign control ordinances, for example, 
include sign companies and the owners of land on which signs are 
located, who are usually paid an annual fee by the advertisers.108 In 
addition, a general sign control program may make it difficult or im-
possible for certain businesses--particularly service stations along 
primary highways; restaurants, motels, and shops catering primarily 
to travelers; and privately owned tourist attractions-to advertise 
their goods and services to their primary customers. The total elimi-
nation of advertising signs, without at least providing informational 
signs as a substitute, will injure the patrons of such enterprises as 
well, for they will not be able to find the· businesses that cater to 
their needs. However, a legislature need not choose between pro-
hibiting such advertising altogether, as defenders of aesthetic inter-
ests may wish, and abstaining from regulation, as the advocates of 
competing interests would urge. A legislative body may, for exam-
ple, permit only on-premise signs, 109 and it may even limit on-premise 
advertising in terms of number of signs per enterprise and distance 
from the location of the enterprise.110 It may allow only informational 
signs, which list businesses likely to be of interest to travelers, or 
adopt the approach taken by many turnpikes of posting a sign at each 
exit noting the availability of motel, food, and gas services designated 
only by type and indicating that more detailed information is avail-
able at designated places, such as tollbooths. Where the advertising 
is purely commercial, the Supreme Court has declared that the first 
amendment does not bar governmental restraints.111 
A more difficult problem arises when signs are used for political, 
108. It should be noted that the prohibition of existing signs may be considered a 
taking that must be compensated by the state. See note 49 supra, On the valuation 
of such interests for eminent domain purposes, see Atherton, Valuation Problems 
Involving Aesthetic Programs, in JUNKYARDS, GERANIUMS AND JURISPRUDENCE: AEsnmTI:cs 
AND THE I.Aw 112, 122-25 (Proceedings, ABA Section on Local Govt. Law, June 2·3, 
1967). 
109. See, e.g., In re Cromwell v. Ferrier, 19 N.Y.2d 263,225 N.E.2d 749, 279 N.Y.S.2d 
22 (1967) (township zoning ordinance). 
110. See, e.g., WASH, REv. CooE § 47.42.045 (Supp. 1972). 
111. Valentine v. Christensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942). Cf. Breard v. Alexandria, Ml 
U.S. 622 (1951). 
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rather than commercial, advertising, for such signs are arguably en-
titled to special protection under the first amendment. The Michigan 
Attorney General, for example, recently ruled that federal and state 
constitutional protections of freedom of speech require that the dis-
play of political advertising signs by a property owner cannot be 
prohibited or controlled by local regulations.112 This result, however, 
does not seem compelled by either the state or the federal constitu-
tions.118 In Kovacs v. Cooper,114 the United States Supreme Court 
upheld the application of a Trenton, New Jersey, prohibitive ordi-
nance to the making of comments concerning a labor dispute from a 
sound truck. The Court ruled that "[t]he preferred position of free-
dom of speech . . . does not require legislators to be insensible to 
claims by citizens to comfort and convenience"115 and found that 
reasonable regulation of such information-conveying techniques is 
constitutional.116 The Michigan Attorney General could have simi-
larly pointed out that if local legislative bodies find that the prolifera-
tion of political campaign posters has reached the point where it 
has become a public nuisance, reasonable regulation for the aesthetic 
benefit of the community is legitimate as long as politicians can 
effectively communicate their views to the public by other means. 
In fact, most political posters convey very little information but 
rather consist primarily of simple messages urging a vote for the can-
didate advertised. Kovacs permits citizen claims of comfort and quiet 
reasonably to limit freedom of speech; the interest in a visually at-
tractive neighborhood should similarly permit reasonable limits on 
other forms of political advertising. 
In People v. Stover117 a court did uphold the application of a 
prohibitive ordinance in the face of freedom of speech claims when 
112. Mich. Atty. Gen. Op. No. 4777, May 7, 1973. The opinion notes the distinction 
between commercial and political advertising, id. at 3, and also suggests that prohibi-
tions of political advertising would be constitutional if an unlawful act, such as trespass, 
were involved. Id. See also Peltz v. City of South Euclid, 11 Ohio St. 2d 128, 228 N.E.2d 
320 (1967). 
113. The Michigan Constitution provides: "Every person may freely speak, write, 
express and publish his views on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of such 
right; and no law shall be enacted to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or the 
press." MICH. CONST. art. I, § 5. This provision appears to be based on the first amend-
ment to the United States Constitution and has not been given separate meaning by 
Michigan courts. Thus, the interpretation of the two constitutions on this point should 
be identical. 
114. 336 U.S. 77 (1949). 
115. 336 U.S. at 88. 
116. In contrast, in Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948), the Supreme Court in-
validated a soundtruck-control ordinance that prohibited the use of such devices except 
for dissemination of news items and matters of public concern permitted by the chief 
of police. The Court found this statutory provision too widely drawn, because it 
prescribed no standards for the discretion exercised by the chief of police. 
117. 12 N.Y.2d 462, 191 N.E.2d 272, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734, appeal dismissed, 375 U.S. 
42 (1963). 
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the damage to the aesthetic environment was severe. In that case, the 
defendants had hung old clothes and rags on clotheslines in the front 
and side yards of their comer house in a residential district as a 
protest against the high taxes imposed by the city. After the protest 
had continued for five years, the city enacted an ordinance prohibit-
ing the erection and maintenance of clotheslines in a front or side 
yard abutting a street and brought suit against the Stovers. The court 
rejected the Stovers' defense based on the right to symbolic speech, 
and, despite the prosecution's argument that the ordinance was sus-
tainable on the basis of economic and safety considerations, found 
aesthetic interests sufficient to support the application of the ordi-
nance where the proscribed conduct was "unnecessarily offensive to 
the visual sensibilities of the average person."118 
The primary adverse effect of a second kind of legislation-
scenic area and scenic easement programs-is on those interested in 
the further development of the areas in question. These programs 
overlap the sign control programs to a certain extent, but scenic 
area and easement programs, unlike sign control ordinances, typi-
cally prohibit signs altogether, with no exceptions, instead of merely 
limiting them.119 Another interest that competes with the aesthetic 
interest in these cases is that of the owner whose land is taken. How-
ever, easements or fees simple are taken under the power of eminent 
domain, and compensation must be paid to the landowner.120 Thus, 
a legislative finding that the aesthetic interest outweighs the interest 
of the landowner does not completely sacrifice the interest of the 
landowner, as it might in a purely regulatory program. 
Zoning regulation for aesthetic purposes is opposed, for the most 
part, by those who have traditionally opposed zoning for other pur-
poses. As with scenic areas programs, these include individual prop-
erty o-wners who want to use their property for purposes, often very 
profitable, that are forbidden by an ordinance and commercial es-
118. 12 N.Y.2d at 468, 191 N.E.2d at 276, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 734. It is not altogether 
safe to place too much reliance on Stover, because on its facts it might now be over• 
ruled on the basis of the symbolic speech protection given in Tinker v. Des Moines 
School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969). See Comment, Zoning, Aesthetics and the First 
Amendment, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 81, 99 (1964). 
On the limitations of the application of the first amendment to aesthetic interests, 
see generally Note, Drug Songs and the Federal Communications Commission, 5 U. 
MICH. J. L. REF. 334, 341-45 (1972). See also People v. Radich, 26 N.Y.2d 114,257 N.E.2d 
30, 308 N.Y.S.2d 846 (1970), afjd. by an equally divided court, 401 U.S. 531 (1971). 
119. See, e.g., Mullen, Scenic Easements: Techniques of Conveyancing, in JUNKYARDS, 
GERANIUMS AND JURISPRUDENCE: AEsTHETics AND THE LAW, supra note 108, at 230, 240-42. 
120. See, e.g., McCoy v. Union Elevated R.R., 247 U.S. 354, 365 (1918): "The 
fundamental right guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment is that the owner shall 
not be deprived of the market value of his property under a rule of law that makes it 
impossible for him to obtain just compensation." See generally 1 P. NICHOLS, EMINENT 
DOMAIN § 4.8 (rev. 3d ed. J. Sackman 1964); 3 id. ch. 8 (1965). 
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tablishments that want to locate in areas restricted to other uses.121 
Sometimes these interests will be expressed in terms of the free-
dom to develop one's property as one pleases. For example, a prop-
erty owner may claim that controls prevent the building of an ar-
chitecturally unique building and thus restrict artistic freedom and 
experimentation. Indeed, it is quite possible that this occurred in 
Reid v. Architectural Board of Review.122 However, while the gen-
eral imposition of architectural controls may give rise to a stifling 
conformity that would eliminate creative innovation,123 the total pro-
hibition of controls would deny to those who so desire the oppor-
tunity to live in architecturally planned communities. So long as un-
regulated areas exist where architects may build as they please, it is 
arguable that architectural nonconformity is not unduly restricted 
by controls. 
One competing interest that must be weighed by a legislature in 
deciding whether to impose any kind of aesthetic legislation is the 
expenditure of government money that may be necessary. Aesthetic 
zoning regulations can be included in present zoning programs and 
administered for a relatively small additional expenditure. Similarly, 
architectural review boards are relatively inexpensive. But the pur-
chase of scenic easements and scenic areas, the elimination of bill-
boards, and the preservation of wilderness areas are often quite costly. 
Once aesthetic legislation has been enacted, the courts are likely 
to be called upon to distinguish those measures that strike a reason-
able balance between competing interests from those that are un-
reasonable, either as such or as applied in particular cases. Regula-
tions within the scope of the police power will be presumed valid, 124 
and the challenger will be required to show the unreasonableness of 
the balance made by the legislature. However, even if aesthetics in 
general is accepted as a valid purpose of legislation, a particular regu-
lation may be invalidated if it is found to be an arbitrary and capri-
cious exercise of the police power. 
In Sunad, Inc. v. City of Sarasota,125 for example, the Supreme 
Court of Florida held that the distinctions made in an ordinance 
limiting the size of advertising signs in business and industrial dis-
121. For a description of a controversy between the supporters of legislation enacted 
at least partially for aesthetic control and the industrial supporters of the development 
ethic, see N.Y. Times, July 16, 1972, § 3 (Business and Finance), at 1, col. 6. 
122. 119 Ohio App. 67, 192 N.E.2d 74 (1963). See text accompanying notes 85-89 
supra. 
123. See Babcock, supra note 77, at 30. 
124. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 281 U.S. 682 (1930); 
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Sullivan v. City of 
Shreveport, 251 U.S. 169 (1919); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915). 
125. 122 S.2d 611 (Fla. 1960). 
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tricts were unreasonable and discriminatory. Under the ordinance, 
wall signs at "point of sale" locations could be unlimited in size, while 
wall signs at other locations were limited to 300 square feet, and all 
other signs were limited to 180 square feet. Petitioner was a lessor of 
billboards of 300 square feet, a size standardized throughout the 
United States in order to reduce the costs of making posters. The 
court held that, although aesthetics is a proper basis for regulatory 
legislation, the distinctions made in this ordinance were not justifi-
able on aesthetic grounds: 
[W]e find insurmountable difficulty to a decision that a wall sign 
300 square feet in size at non-point of sale would not offend while a 
sign of the same size on one of petitioner's billboards would, or that 
an unrestricted wall sign, at point of sale, would be inoffensive but 
one of petitioner's signs would shock refined senses, or for that mat-
ter, that a roof, ground, or other sign could be only 180 square feet 
while a wall sign could be at least 300 square feet and, if at point of 
sale, unlimited.120 
Sunad illustrates some of the difficulties that may be encoun-
tered in judicial review of aesthetic legislation. While it does demon-
strate that a court may uphold aesthetic regulation in general but 
still invalidate a particular ordinance, it is not at all clear that the 
court was correct in finding this ordinance to be arbitrary and un-
reasonable. The court evaluated the statutory distinctions on aes-
thetic grounds alone127 and ignored the fact that the ordinance neces-
sarily involved a legislative balancing of the interest of aesthetics, 
which may have in itself demanded a complete prohibition of ad-
vertising signs, and competing nonaesthetic interests. For example, 
a prohibition of all signs would infringe upon the needs of adver-
tisers to make their products known, a need that is particularly strong 
at the point of sale. The point-of-sale/nonpoint-of-sale distinction 
may have represented a compromise with these interests. The distinc-
tion between wall signs and billboards may similarly have represented 
a compromise between aesthetic and business interests. The sup-
porters of the former may have been willing to allow larger signs on 
walls, where the aesthetic damage has already been done, in exchange 
for stricter limits on billboards, which may encroach upon and fur-
ther destroy existing vistas. Thus, the court should have asked 
whether the distinctions made in the ordinance represented a reason-
able compromise between aesthetics and other, nonaesthetic, inter-
ests, and not whether they were reasonable on aesthetic grounds alone. 
The judiciary must acknowledge the importance of aesthetic in-
126. 122 S.2d at 614-15. 
127. 122 S.2d at 614. 
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terests, instead of concealing them behind other, "more respectable"
objectives. 28 Currently, aesthetic controls are usually upheld in
practice, if not on aesthetic grounds alone. Consequently, it is un-
likely that an express recognition of purely aesthetic interests will
open the gates to a flood of legislation that would not otherwise be
enacted. 2 9 In fact, it has been suggested that a more honest approach
would put the opponents of particular aesthetic regulations in a better
position to attack them, for the primary issue will be faced directly.13 0
The question of the validity of legislation enacted solely for aesthetic
purposes will be raised more insistently in the future. The increase
in the general level of aesthetic interest and sophistication,' 8 ' and the
reduction of our natural aesthetic resources will create a rising de-
mand for the preservation of the environment that must be effectively
accommodated by the legal system.
128. See text accompanying notes 98-107 supra.
129. Anderson, Regulation of Land Use for Aesthetic Purposes-An Appraisal of
People v. Stover, 15 SYRACUSE L. Ray. 26, 33-40 (1963).
130. Id.
131. See Steinbach, Aesthetic Zoning: Property Values and the Judicial Decision
Process, 35 Mo. L. REV. 176, 183 (1970). See also Burch, How American Taste Is Chang-
ing, FORTUNE, July 1959, at 115.
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